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EMPLOYER ORGANIZATION AND THE 





In the literature on political economy and historical sociology, American 
exceptionalism has typically been framed as a question of why American labor 
unions appeared so weak and so conservative compared to their European 
counterparts. The usual answers point to American political culture,1 
characteristics of the working class,2 features of American political parties or the 
party system,3 or aspects of the American state.4 However, by posing the question 
as an inquiry into what is different about American labor, scholars have 
overlooked the possibility that what is exceptional about the United States may 
have more to do with the distinctive features of American employers rather than 
of its unions or its working class. 
This Article attempts to fill that gap by bringing a comparative perspective to 
bear on an underexplored aspect of American exceptionalism: the peculiar 
features of American employers and the legal framework regulating firm 
competition in which they historically developed. A large literature on rich 
democracies demonstrates that the structure and organizational capacities of 
employers are critical to the operation of the political economy. The dominant 
literature on varieties of capitalism draws a broad distinction between the liberal 
market economies of Anglo-Saxon countries and the coordinated market 
economies of Europe, a difference rooted in the capacity of employers to 
coordinate amongst themselves (and with unions) to achieve joint economic gains 
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through cooperation.5 While Europe’s coordinated model is as successful in 
economic terms as the alternative liberal model, it has traditionally been 
associated with significantly lower levels of income inequality and greater social 
solidarity.6 A high level of employer organization is crucial to the success of this 
model: strong employer associations are critical partners in encompassing 
collective bargaining, which can set limits on cutthroat strategies based on wage 
competition.7 Employer organization also allows firms to cooperate on other 
issues such as training that support the kind of high wage, high quality, and high 
value-added strategies that are more characteristic of Europe’s “socially 
embedded” variety of capitalism.8 
In the comparative literature, the United States is seen as the paradigmatic 
liberal market economy.9 While U.S. employers have developed powerful 
lobbying organizations (for example, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber 
of Commerce), they lack the kind of strong, centralized trade and employer 
associations that allow employers in Europe to cooperate with each other and 
with unions in ways that support more egalitarian outcomes.10  
The distinctiveness of American employer organization is best highlighted 
with reference to developments elsewhere. My analysis will focus on a 
comparison of the United States and Germany. Just as the United States has been 
seen as the quintessential liberal market economy, Germany has long been 
considered the paradigmatic coordinated model.11 The United States is 
characterized by weak employer associations and low capacity for strategic 
coordination in the market. In contrast, Germany exemplifies the socially 
embedded variety of capitalism, featuring higher levels of employer coordination 
and more cooperative engagement with strong and centralized industrial unions 
who play an important role in the management of the economy and even of 
individual firms. 
The purpose of this Article is to elucidate the role of the law in shaping the 
U.S. and German models of employer organization and their respective market 
economies. Specifically, I zero in on legislative and legal developments in the late 
 
 5.  Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF 
CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 8–9 (Peter A. 
Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
 6.  For some comparisons see, for example, Kathleen Thelen, The American Precariat: U.S. 
Capitalism in Comparative Perspective, 17 PERSP. ON POL. 5, 5 (2019). 
 7.  Id. at 17–18, 23 n.68. 
 8.  Wolfgang Streeck, On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production, in BEYOND 
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Matzner & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1991). 
 9.  See, e.g., Hall & Soskice, supra note 5, at 27–33 (using the United States to illustrate the 
distinctive features of liberal market economies generally). 
 10.  See id. at 27 (discussing how U.S. employers rely on market mechanisms to coordinate rather 
than coordinating through institutions such as trade associations and employer organizations—as is more 
common in coordinated market economies). 
 11.  See id. at 21–27 (using the German case to illustrate the defining features of coordinated 
economies generally). 
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nineteenth century to document the impact they had on the organization, goals, 
and strategies of American employers, and, with that, on the political-economic 
architecture of contemporary American capitalism as a whole. In Part II, I discuss 
in more depth the importance of a comparative historical perspective. Part III 
describes the impact of U.S. competition policy of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries on employer organization and strategies. Part IV provides, 
by contrast, the differing developments in Germany during the same period that 
contributed to its coordinated market economy. I conclude in Part V by exploring 




THE UNITED STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A crucial difference between developments in Europe and the United 
States—unexplored in the literature on the varieties of capitalism—concerns the 
impact of differences in the legal regimes governing competition policy in the late 
nineteenth century. The literature on competition policy in this period focuses 
heavily on the large trusts and cartels that emerged at that time. However, to 
understand the importance of these different competition regimes for labor 
politics, we need to direct our attention instead to their impact on the smaller, 
skill-intensive batch producers who were at the center of early industrialization 
and whose skilled workers formed the core of early union movements 
everywhere. 
The legal framework in Europe’s coordinated model allowed the strongest 
and most competitive of such firms to spearhead the construction of strong 
coordinating capacities, not so much to confront unions but to discipline marginal 
producers engaged in ruinous, cutthroat competition.12 In the United States, by 
contrast, the very different rules governing competition allowed marginal firms 
to shape the terms of the emerging labor regime, as low-quality producers were 
able to turn to the courts to assist them in dismantling nascent forms of 
coordination that posed a threat to their survival.13 Where employers could 
defeat unions in court, they had little need to coordinate among themselves in 
the market, since the efforts of even small numbers of players—winning key 
judicial decisions—resonated widely and affected all actors subject to the 
prevailing regulatory regime. The kinds of marginal, lower-cost firms that 
prevailed in these contests could then rely on the discipline of the market to bring 
other firms in line. 
Comparing the United States and Germany is fruitful and revealing 
because—contrary to many popular accounts—the two countries shared some 
 
 12.  See, e.g., GARY HERRIGEL, INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTIONS: THE SOURCES OF GERMAN 
INDUSTRIAL POWER 60–61 (1996) (detailing how economic turbulence spurred the creation of collective 
governance mechanisms in Germany’s southwestern states). 
 13.  See infra notes 111 & 120. 
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strikingly similar characteristics at the end of the nineteenth century.14 For 
example, it is commonly asserted that American unions faced an unusually 
inhospitable political landscape, and it is certainly true that they confronted 
hostile employers as well as a highly complicit state.15 However, it is not clear that 
the United States stood out in this regard. Early unions in most other countries 
had to confront explicit anti-combination laws, and governments—often, as in 
Germany, authoritarian governments—did not hesitate to harass unions and 
intervene in industrial conflicts.16 At the end of the nineteenth century, 
unionization rates in Germany and the United States were nearly identical at 
about five percent.17 
Other scholars emphasize the impact of Germany’s late industrialization (and 
associated industrial and union concentration) versus the United States’ early, 
more gradual and decentralized, industrialization.18 However, these differences, 
too, are frequently overblown. In fact, the United States and Germany both 
began to industrialize with small-scale and decentralized production in the early 
to mid-nineteenth century, and in both cases industrial growth later centered on 
key infrastructural industries like steel and electrical machinery, many of which 
were dominated by a small number of players.19 Industrial employment in the two 
countries in the early twentieth century was broadly similar, accounting for about 
a third of total employment, with employment in agriculture accounting for 
another third.20 
Moreover, while much has been made of differences in the sizes of the 
domestic markets, this observation also needs to be qualified. First of all, the size 
of the national market was not an issue for the leading firms in either country; 
these leading firms were in fact heavily involved, and indeed dominating forces, 
in key world markets—steel and electrical manufacturing, as well as chemicals 
for Germany and oil for the United States.21 More generally, Germany had 
consolidated its internal market well before the country’s unification in 1870, 
while in the United States many obstacles to a truly uniform domestic market 
 
 14.  See Colleen A. Dunlavy & Thomas Welskopp, Myths and Peculiarities: Comparing U.S. and 
German Capitalism, 41 GERMAN HIST. INST. BULL. 33, 35 (2007) (“When trends in the two countries are 
set side by side . . . the differences that these stories imply between the American and German styles of 
capitalism at the turn of the century turn out to be much smaller than imagined.”). 
 15.  See, e.g., FORBATH, supra note 4, at 59–97 (analyzing the use of the injunction in labor disputes). 
 16.  See Klaus Schönhoven, Gewerkschaftliches Organisationsverhalten im Wilhelminischen 
Deutschland, in ARBEITER IM INDUSTRIALISIERUNGSPROZEß 403, 414–15 (Werner Conze & Ulrich 
Engelhardt eds., 1979). 
 17.  Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 14, at 42. 
 18.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS (1962). 
 19.  The steel industry was dominated by U.S. Steel in the United States and Krupp in Germany 
while the electrical machinery industry was dominated by GE and Westinghouse in the United States 
and Siemens and AEG in Germany. Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 14, at 35–36. 
 20.  Id. at 36–37. 
 21.  Id. at 35–36. 
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persisted until the closing decades of the nineteenth century.22 One main obstacle 
in the United States was that state governments retained considerable power to 
establish independent economic policies and distinct corporate legal regimes.23 
While frequently exaggerating those differences, the literature has mostly 
overlooked a much more striking difference between the two countries: the way 
in which state policy in the late nineteenth century dealt with issues of 
competition and inter-firm cooperation. The literature on this subject that does 
exist focuses—understandably—on the big U.S. trusts and the large German 
cartels that emerged in this period.24 Less well-covered is what was happening 
among small proprietary capitalists engaged in decentralized production and 
heavily reliant on skilled labor.25 In Germany, the most competitive of such firms 
in the late nineteenth century were organizing among themselves to mitigate 
their own potential ruinous competition by developing governance institutions 
through which to socialize risk in the face of market volatility.26 As elaborated 
below, similar arrangements emerged in the United States at this time. The 
difference is that these arrangements did not survive in the United States. I argue 
that state policy, as interpreted by the courts, played a key role in undermining 
nascent forms of coordination that flourished in Europe and that would later 
provide an associational infrastructure that proved more congenial to the 
emergence of a coordinated and social variety of capitalism. 
A. The Context—Economic and Legal 
The closing years of the nineteenth century were a period of considerable 
economic tumult in the United States and Europe alike. Advances in 
communication and transportation had upset previously stable local markets by 
exposing firms to intensified competition from producers in other parts of the 
country and from abroad. A major financial crisis in 1873 triggered a severe 
economic downturn that enveloped Europe and North America and ushered in 
two decades of economic stagnation known as the “Long Depression.”27 These 
developments brought an abrupt end to the post-Civil War boom in the United 
States and shook the newly unified German state to its core.28 
In both countries, manufacturing was hit especially hard. Overcapacity across 
key markets caused wages and profits to plummet, setting in motion vicious 
 
 22.  Id. at 47–49. 
 23.  Id. at 46–49. 
 24.  For a review of the literature on cartels, see, for example, Jeffrey Fear, Cartels, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS HISTORY 268, 268–92 (Geoffrey Jones & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2008). 
 25.  Gary Herrigel is an exception to this, and his work has deeply influenced my thinking. See 
HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 33–71. 
 26.  See generally id.  
 27.  Thomas Klitgaard & James Narron, Crisis Chronicles: The Long Depression and the Panic of 
1873, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Feb. 5, 2016), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/02/crisis-
chronicles-the-long-depression-and-the-panic-of-1873.html [https://perma.cc/Q924-E4HN]. 
 28.  See id.; Donald Sassoon, To Understand This Crisis We Can Look to the Long Depression Too, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/29/long-depression-
crashes-capitalism-history [https://perma.cc/NDB8-2K93]. 
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cutthroat competition amongst firms and provoking considerable industrial 
strife. In this context, firms in many industries sought to stabilize prices by 
banding together into arrangements to protect themselves against this destructive 
competition. This was the context that produced the great trusts in the United 
States and the cartels in Germany that tend to dominate the scholarly accounts 
of this period.29 Firms in both countries—particularly those in capital-intensive 
industries that relied heavily on unskilled labor—forged new arrangements to 
seize control of large market shares in a period of extreme economic turbulence.30 
These trusts and large autarkic cartels could alleviate the competitive pressures 
they faced either through hierarchy (for example, U.S. trusts and mergers) or 
internal contracting (Germany’s “Interessengemeinschaften,” or “communities of 
interest”).31 
Similar strategies were either not available or not attractive to smaller scale, 
decentralized manufacturers who engaged in more specialized batch production 
and relied heavily on skilled labor. For these producers, coordination—for 
example, through robust trade associations—could provide relief from market 
turbulence. However, purely voluntary cooperation is notoriously fragile, 
particularly in periods of intense and destructive competition when the incentives 
to engage in opportunistic behavior are almost irresistible. In these 
circumstances, leading firms often found it in their interest to accept—in some 
cases, actively enlist—the assistance of unions to help them enforce compliance.32 
Thus, especially in skill-intensive industries dominated by small and medium-
sized firms, alternative forms of coordination frequently emerged in which 
employers organized among themselves to stabilize competition and sometimes 
turned to unions to police these arrangements by punishing firms engaged in 
cutthroat competition based on wage chiseling.33 In such cases, cooperation with 
organized labor “held out the promise of comfortable profits for employers and 
wages for employees—a peaceable kingdom erected on the industrywide 
collective bargaining agreement.”34 
 
 29.  See, e.g., J. SINGER, DAS LAND DER MONOPOLE: AMERIKA ODER DEUTSCHLAND? (1913). 
 30.  Space does not permit a full discussion of the quite different forms these arrangements took in 
the two countries. Trusts were a distinctly American innovation, one that responded to the specific 
incentives and constraints of the American political economy and antitrust regime. German cartels were 
less hierarchically organized because they were based on contracts that were legally enforceable. See 
PAUL FELIX ASHROTT, DIE AMERIKANISCHEN TRUSTS ALS WEITERBILDUNG DES 
UNTERNEHMERVERBÄNDE 2 (1889). 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  See PETER SWENSON, CAPITALISTS AGAINST MARKETS: THE MAKING OF LABOR MARKETS 
AND WELFARE STATES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN 122–24 (2002). 
 33.  See id. at 63 (defining chiseling as “low-price competition made possible by imprudent and 
shabby practices”). 
 34.  DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE 
LIBERALISM 5 (1995). 
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B. Diverging Legal Regimes 
In both Germany and the United States, proprietary capitalists engaged in 
labor- and skill-intensive manufacturing experimented with new organizational 
forms to confront the turbulent markets of the late nineteenth century. In the 
United States, such experiments devolved into an all-out war against organized 
labor.35 In Germany, the cooperative arrangements that they organized formed 
the basis of powerful trade associations that stabilized Germany’s vaunted 
industrial middle class.36 This made it possible for the German trade associations 
to make peace with the skilled workers on whose contributions their production 
model relied. The different fates of these experiments and new organizational 
arrangements in the late nineteenth century turned on the responses of the state 
and courts. 
The key antitrust legislation in the United States was the Sherman Act of 
1890.37 The context that produced this law was widespread public concern about 
the growing concentration of economic power in the American political 
economy. Americans watched with alarm as Standard Oil assumed control of 
much of the country’s oil refining and as new trusts cropped up in other, more 
consumer-facing, industries, such as sugar and whisky.38 
Even as the public clamored for an antitrust statute, the legal and scholarly 
communities were divided on the issue.39 The American Economic Association’s 
first meeting, in 1885, took up the question gingerly.40 While some delegates 
warned of the hazards of rampant competition and growing concentration in the 
hands of the powerful, most were loath to endorse state intervention of any sort, 
lest they be branded “socialist.”41 The legal community—still steeped in British 
common law tradition—believed that many of the emerging market behaviors 
should be prohibited, but thought that the solution lay not in further legislation 
but rather in the vigorous enforcement of existing common law.42 
Elected politicians were apparently less conflicted, as the Sherman Act sailed 
through Congress nearly unanimously.43 Though wildly popular in Congress, the 
resulting legislation was famously ambiguous, and it would largely fall to the 
courts to resolve those ambiguities.44 The results of the early years of its 
 
 35.  See id. 
 36.  HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 20. 
 37.  WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 3 (1965). 
 38.  Id. at 69–70. 
 39.  Id. at 76–78. 
 40.  See id. at 71–72 (“Following a long debate the [Association’s] platform was finally revised, and 
the new version omitted the explicit denunciation [of the laissez-faire doctrine allowing trusts to form at 
will.]”). 
 41.  Id. at 72. 
 42.  See id. at 77–85. 
 43.  Id. at 95. 
 44.  Among the matters left unclarified was whether labor was meant to be exempted. See LETWIN, 
supra note 37, at 97–98. 
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enforcement were thus highly uneven. “Loose” or horizontal combinations—
arrangements between independent firms or individuals—were held to be per se 
illegal, for the common law had long prohibited such behaviors as constituting a 
restraint of trade.45 By contrast, combinations formed by trust or merger were 
treated differently: the Court required proof “that the ‘evident purpose’ of the 
combination was to restrain trade.”46 Richard Posner’s analysis documents that 
in the first two decades after the Sherman Act was passed, 50 of the 61 antitrust 
cases brought by the Department of Justice involved horizontal combinations or 
conspiracies.47 
Germany went in a markedly different direction in the late nineteenth 
century, legalizing cartels and also expressly sanctioning other forms of collective 
self-help among independent firms. Although Germany later came to be known 
as the “country of the cartels,”48 in fact before the country’s unification in 1870, 
leading German states had embraced a more laissez-faire model of economic 
growth.49 However, these views quickly fell out of favor in the so-called 
Gründerkrise, the economic crisis that rocked the country in the first years of its 
existence after 1870 and that inspired a search for alternatives to liberalism as 
developmental model.50 
Social scientists and the legal community were crucial in steering Germany 
toward an alternative, organized, market ideology.51 Economic policy in this 
period was shaped especially by the Verein für Socialpolitik (Verein), an 
organization of economists and legal scholars that enjoyed privileged access to 
the German bureaucracy by virtue of its influential research on pressing 
contemporary social and economic issues.52 Formed in 1873, the Verein provided 
an institutional bridge between political economy and legal science in support of 
an alternative to liberals or socialists.53 The organization’s guiding principle was 
that of a managed market—one in which competition would be organized and 
moderated. Given this orientation, the Verein viewed emerging efforts at 
 
 45.  NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–
1904, at 174 (1985). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 tbl.1, 
396 tbl.22 (1970). 
 48.  Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Law and Market Organization: The Historical Experience in Germany 
from 1900 to the Law Against Restraints of Competition (1957), 151 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 5 (1995). 
 49.  Gerhard Lehmbruch, The Institutional Embedding of Market Economies: The German “Model” 
and Its Impact on Japan, in THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN 
COMPARISON 39, 48–49 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001). 
 50.  Id. at 50–51. 
 51.  See Nörr, supra note 48, at 5 (“Both [political economy and legal science] were linked 
institutionally as well, particularly in the famous ‘Verein für Socialpolitik’ . . . which came to be the 
opinion leader of the Bismarck-Wilhelmian Empire and embodied, as it were, the nation’s social 
conscience in those decades.”). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See Lehmbruch, supra note 49, at 55 (discussing the ideology of the Verein). 
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employer coordination in an overall sanguine light.54 Indeed, the first German 
study of the impact of cartels, by the economist Friedrich Kleinwächter in 1879, 
held Manchester liberalism responsible for the economic crisis and characterized 
cartels approvingly as a defense against excessive competition.55 
Kleinwächter was not alone. A chorus of economists viewed cartels as 
representing a more advanced state of economic development.56 Economic 
sociologist Albert Schäffle penned an influential essay in 1898 entitled “Zum 
Kartellwesen und zur Kartellpolitik” [“On the Nature of Cartels and Cartel 
Policy”] that painted a “bleak picture” of the free market as “a wild war of all 
against all,” waged with the most deceitful tools and resulting in “evil 
consequences.”57 
In sharp contrast to the confusion and wrangling within the U.S. legal 
profession as to the proper bounds of the Sherman Act in this period,58 there was 
a rather high degree of consensus in the German legal community on this matter. 
The influential Juristentag, a national association of legal scholars and 
practitioners, explicitly endorsed cartels and the role of the courts in sanctioning 
these organizational forms and contributing to their stabilization.59 The dominant 
view at the association’s 1902 and 1904 congresses opposed legislation that would 
suppress cartels.60 Delegates certainly discussed the possible negative impact of 
cartels and their need to be monitored and regulated.61 However, rather than ban 
the cartels, the delegates’ prevailing view was that the state should recognize 
them in order to facilitate such oversight.62 Insofar as cartels were viewed as a 
national response to destructive competition, supporting and monitoring them 
was the best defense against such abuse.63 
In these debates, speakers invoked the United States as a negative model. 
Thus, for example, at the 1905 convention of the Verein, economist and legal 
scholar Gustav Schmoller characterized the American case as a cautionary tale.64 
Schmoller, who as Chairman of the Verein had exercised outsized influence in 
the German political economy since the 1870s, delivered an extended defense of 
German cartels that bordered on rapturous.65 According to Schmoller, 
 
 54.  KLAUS RICHTER, DIE WIRKUNGSGESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHTS VOR 1914, 
at 105–06 (2007). 
 55.  See generally FRIEDRICH KLEINWÄCHTER, DIE KARTELLE: EIN BEITRAG ZUR FRAGE DER 
ORGANISATION DER VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT (1879); see also RICHTER, supra note 54, at 55–56. 
 56.  RICHTER, supra note 54, at 98. 
 57.  Id. at 188. 
 58.  See LETWIN, supra note 37, at 143–81 (detailing the legal wrangling that produced rulings that 
were almost equally split as to the bounds of the Sherman Act, and in which more than one opinion was 
submitted on both concurring and dissenting sides). 
 59.  See Nörr, supra note 48, at 6–7. 
 60.  See RICHTER, supra note 54, at 201–07. 
 61.  Id. at 201. 
 62.  Id. at 206. 
 63.  Id. at 201–02. 
 64.  Id. at 207–10. 
 65.  Id.; Nörr, supra note 48, at 7–8. 
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cooperative cartels of the sort that had been cropping up all across Germany were 
not only benign, they were also ethical because they looked out for the collective 
interests of both their member firms and their workers.66 As such, they guarded 
against the short-sighted opportunism that was rampant in the United States.67 
Schmoller argued that the U.S. trusts were founded by egoistic money grubbers 
out for private gain, while the founders of cartels were “educators who want[ed] 
to secure the victory of the collective interest of a branch of trade over the egoistic 
interests of individuals.”68 
The next Parts sketch out the key differences between the American and 
German approaches to competition and employer coordination, and the 
downstream consequences for employer organization, and ultimately for 
organized labor and the political economy as a whole. 
 
III 
THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES 
One of the most consequential legacies of judicial politics in the United States 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to actively disarticulate 
emerging efforts at employer coordination, especially among small and medium-
sized firms, and to confound efforts to develop the kinds of capacities that were 
emerging at this time in Europe’s coordinated market economies. 
Economic historian Naomi Lamoreaux’s pathbreaking study of the American 
merger movement captures the realities of the economic context that American 
manufacturers confronted in the late nineteenth century.69 In the face of intense 
price competition, firms frequently sought to organize among themselves “to 
relieve downward pressure on prices by restricting output and to distribute the 
costs of this curtailment evenly across the industry.”70 Such efforts, however, 
suffered repeated breakdowns, as members opportunistically broke rank to shore 
up their own position.71 These conditions, she argues, were what drove the “great 
merger movement,” as companies sought relief through mergers that provided 
refuge from the ravages of hyper competition and overproduction. Thousands of 
smaller producers vanished as they were subsumed by big corporations in this 
period.72 
Lamoreaux’s account provides an enormously important corrective to the 
conventional wisdom, which is, for example, classically articulated by Pulitzer 
Prize winning Professor of Business History Alfred Chandler.73 Economic 
 
 66.  RICHTER, supra note 54, at 208. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 208 (translating the original text). 
 69.  See generally LAMOREAUX, supra note 45. 
 70.  Id. at 15. 
 71.  Id. at 14–16, 25. 
 72.  Id. at 1–2. 
 73.  See ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 1 (1977) (arguing that “modern business enterprise” became the dominant force 
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distress, not the promise of greater efficiency, provided the main impetus for 
many of the mergers of this period.74 For our purposes, however, Lamoreaux’s 
otherwise masterful study suffers two shortcomings. The first is an overemphasis 
on the uniqueness of the American situation. She attributes the merger 
movement to “a particular conjunction of circumstances” in the United States in 
the 1890s that gave rise to “abnormally serious price wars” and that pushed huge 
numbers of firms toward horizontal mergers.75 However, as noted at the outset, 
the situation faced by American manufacturers in this period was far from 
unique. Germany, Britain, and indeed most of Europe, were suffering similar 
woes, though with quite different consequences. 
Second, and more importantly, Lamoreaux’s analysis misses important 
swathes of American manufacturing. Her analysis distinguishes very broadly 
between specialty producers of high-quality goods, on one hand, and mass 
producers of homogenous products, on the other.76 Lamoreaux pays only fleeting 
attention to the former. They drop out of her analysis because she assumes that 
they were not vulnerable to price competition in the first place and because 
“production [could be] adjusted easily to fluctuations in market demand.”77 Her 
analysis then focuses almost entirely on large consolidations where at least five 
companies merged and draws many of its conclusions from the experiences of 
capital-intensive industries engaged in mass production.78 This broad dichotomy, 
however, overlooks enormous parts of American industry, including sectors that 
would be crucial to the evolution of industrial relations—above all, batch 
producers, especially in the machine and metalworking industries, which relied 
heavily on skilled labor.79 
Such producers did suffer intense and destructive competition, but the 
response of these firms—many of them small and medium-sized family-owned 
firms—was not necessarily mergers, but instead often collective bargaining.80 
Thomas Klug’s observation that “[t]he golden age of trade agreements between 
1897 and 1904 coincided with the great merger movement in American business” 
 
in the market, bringing with it “managerial capitalism,” rather than the market being controlled by an 
“invisible hand of market forces”). 
 74.  LAMOREAUX, supra note 45, at 114. 
 75.  Id. at 12. 
 76.  Id. at 15. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. at 30–31, 46–86 (discussing the impact of capital intensity in fueling price wars and 
ultimately consolidation). 
 79.  As one indicator, Lamoreaux’s study does not include any references to unions or skill. See id. 
 80.  See, e.g., Thomas A. Klug, The Roots of the Open Shop: Employers, Trade Unions, and Craft 
Labor Markets in Detroit, 1859–1907 at 392–97 (Feb. 25, 1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne 
State University) (on file with author). Some such producers did merge: for example, the Detroit railway 
car companies joined with producers elsewhere in 1899, forming the American Car and Foundry 
Company. Id. at 55. And some trusts continued to bargain with unions, for example the Glass Trust, 
which “deliberately unioniz[ed] all the establishments under its control.” Mabel Atkinson, Trusts and 
Trade Unions, 19 POL. SCI. Q. 193, 197–98 (1904). 
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is no coincidence.81 This period saw a proliferation of employer associations of 
various sorts, including what Clarence Bonnett calls “negotiatory” associations 
that relied on unions to encourage employer organization and police firm 
behavior.82 
Most of these firms were not particularly capital intensive, relying instead on 
general purpose machinery operated by skilled workers. Thus, what united the 
firms that turned to collective bargaining in this period was a heavy reliance on 
skilled labor whose wages made up a large part of total production costs.83 For 
example, machine tool producers in the East and Midwest were all engaged in 
such skill-intensive production and sought to confront market turbulence by 
fostering cooperation on wages with their workers and on pricing with each 
other—efforts that led to the 1902 founding of the National Machine Tool 
Builders Association (NMTBA).84 By the end of the nineteenth century, trade 
agreements had been struck in a number of sectors, allowing skilled unions to 
gain an unprecedented foothold in the labor market in the 1890s.85 
Detroit, an important hub of machine production in the nineteenth century, 
provides an example of how unions became a key part of the labor market. 
Detroit’s machine and metalworking firms experienced repeated, devastating 
boom and bust cycles, and suffered problems of overcapacity and destructive 
price wars between 1871 and 1904.86 The stove industry was especially vulnerable 
to these cycles, and therefore employers in this industry organized themselves 
into the Stove Founders National Defense Association (SFNDA) to stabilize 
competition through voluntary cooperation.87 The SFNDA initially rejected 
negotiating with organized labor, but after repeated unsuccessful efforts to 
coordinate among themselves, they turned to the Iron Molders Union (IMU), 
striking a broad and encompassing collective bargaining agreement to 
standardize wages across firms.88 The IMU could monitor wages and punish firms 
that broke out of the deal by depriving them of the skilled labor on which their 
production relied. Thus, starting in 1891 the IMU “was able to play a major role 
 
 81.  Klug, supra note 80, at 547. 
 82.  Bonnett contrasts these to the “belligerent” employers of the period, who have received the 
lion’s share of attention in the literature. See CLARENCE BONNETT, EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF TYPICAL ASSOCIATIONS 22–25 (1922). 
 83.  See Atkinson, supra note 80, at 223 (“[I]n industries where the labor is unskilled and the wages 
are low, if the trust appears before the trade union, then combination among the capitalists makes 
organization among the workers more difficult and lessens their power of resisting unwise or unjust 
demands.”); see also id. at 214–15, 217.  
 84.  Gary Herrigel, Industry as a Form of Order: A Comparison of the Historical Development of the 
Machine Tool Industries in the United States and Germany, in GOVERNING CAPITALIST ECONOMIES: 
PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL OF ECONOMIC SECTORS 97, 107 (J. Rogers Hollinsworth, Philippe C. 
Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1994). 
 85.  Klug, supra note 80, at 243, 505. 
 86.  See id. at 426–98 (describing the cycles of nineteenth and early twentieth century industry in 
Detroit and their effect on labor and labor disputes). 
 87.  See id. at 7. 
 88.  Id. at 471; see id. at 482 (“Unable to bring order and restore profitability to the stove industry 
by themselves, employers turned to the Iron Molders Union to do it for them.”). 
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in rescuing stove manufacturers from destructive competition and falling 
profits.”89 
John Bowman’s study of the bituminous coal industry provides a striking 
portrait of another such industry needing union support.90 Beginning in the 1890s, 
producers of bituminous coal had entered into sweeping interstate wage contracts 
with miners “in the hope that the union would organize capitalist competition by 
preventing the self-destructive wage and price competition generated by 
competitive relations.”91 Bowman emphasized that such arrangements were by 
no means always foisted upon unwilling capitalists, but instead were 
“accepted . . . [by them] to protect themselves from the economic behavior of 
other capitalists.”92 Indeed, in some cases, employers actively supported the 
unionization campaign of the United Mine Workers.93 
Such arrangements were endorsed and vigorously promoted by an 
overarching National Civic Federation (NCF) composed of representatives of 
both unions and employers that was dedicated to promoting collective 
bargaining.94 One of the architects of the NCF was Marcus Alonzo Hanna, a 
“supremely successful industrialist, shipper, and banker” from Ohio who was also 
chairman of the National Republican Committee from 1896 to 1904.95 In his home 
state of Ohio, Hanna had spearheaded the creation of an association of coal 
operators in the 1870s that worked with unions to stabilize the “anarchically 
competitive industry,” and from his perch in the NCF he sought to disseminate 
that model.96 Between 1895 and 1905, “19 employers’ associations and 16 unions 
had negotiated no fewer than 26 national or large district agreements,” and in 
almost every case, “[m]anufacturers’ desire for market control of chaotic price 
competition” brought them together with unions to enforce wage floors and in 
this way inhibited “the outbreak of disruptive price wars.”97 
The fate of these arrangements, however, was powerfully shaped by the 
prevailing legal regime, which allowed employers who were disadvantaged by 
such arrangements to seek relief in the courts. A key player in this was the 
American Anti-Boycott Association (AABA), a network of lawyers who 
specialized in assisting firms in fighting unions, including by disrupting existing 
arrangements that employers had negotiated with labor in efforts to attain 
market stability.98 The AABA was decidedly not an employer or trade 
 
 89.  Id. at 7. 
 90.  John R. Bowman, When Workers Organize Capitalists: The Case of the Bituminous Coal 
Industry, 14 POL. & SOC’Y 289 (1985). 
 91.  Id. at 290. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 296. 
 94.  BONNETT, supra note 82, at 386, 389–91. 
 95.  SWENSON, supra note 32, at 144. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 49. 
 98.  See generally ERNST, supra note 34. In a 1989 Iowa Law Review article, Ernst characterized the 
AABA as “a legal defense fund sustained by the contributions of proprietors of small firms who faced 
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association, and required virtually nothing in the way of organization or 
coordination on the part of client firms. It set itself up as a general purpose 
organization, offering services to firms from all sectors. As such, it was an explicit 
alternative to employer and trade associations such as the NMTBA or the 
NSFDA, whose membership and services were industry- or region-specific. 
The AABA’s mission was more expansive than that of these other 
associations: its express purpose was to shape the authoritative interpretation of 
particular laws by seeking to secure court decisions whose precedent-setting 
impact would resonate far beyond individual sectors or regions.99 Above all, the 
organization sought out cases that would establish that unions too were subject 
to antitrust provisions in the Sherman Act, and to establish that an individual’s 
right to work was to be protected just as vigorously as a business person’s right 
to run his own business. 
The identity of the companies that belonged to the AABA was confidential, 
but their dues financed the provision of the association’s benefits and services—
legal advice and sometimes direct legal representation and court costs.100 The 
organization operated in a highly disciplined and strategic way, carefully 
choosing the cases to take up.101 Thus, the AABA declined to take up weak cases 
that they thought would not promote its agenda, and actively pursued cases that 
they saw as capable of establishing desirable new precedents.102 As founder 
Daniel Davenport emphasized, individual companies were not in a position to 
fight the legal battles necessary to secure favorable decisions.103 Instead, as Ernst 
put it, “what was needed was an organization to spread the costs of suing trade 
unions and developing legal experience on the labor problem, and this was what 
the AABA would provide.”104 
The AABA was wildly successful, winning every one of the cases it took on 
in its first five years.105 Perhaps the most prominent among these was the 
landmark Danbury Hatters case, Loewe v. Lawlor,106 which extended the 
application of antitrust laws to labor unions—a decision that effectively 
 
many of the nation’s strongest unions.” Daniel R. Ernst, The Labor Exemption, 1908–1914, 74 IOWA L. 
REV. 1151, 1151 (1989). For more on the AABA (later renamed the League for Industrial Rights), see 
generally BONNETT, supra note 82, at 449–74. 
 99.  Daniel R. Ernst, The Lawyers and the Labor Trust: A History of the American Anti-Boycott 
Association, 1902–1919 at 68–69 (June 1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on 
file with author). 
 100.  Id. at 69–70, 75. Due to the AABA’s confidentiality policy, exact membership figures do not 
exist, but it was estimated to have about 1,000 members in 1915, and up to 2,000 by 1921. See BONNETT, 
supra note 82, at 449. 
 101.  Ernst, supra note 99, at 69. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  ERNST, supra note 34, at 50. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Ernst, supra note 99, at 69. See also BONNETT, supra note 82, at 458–62 (providing an overview 
of the cases in which the AABA, later the League for Industrial Rights, participated). 
 106.  208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
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precluded the development of industrial unionism in the United States.107 The 
conflict emerged in the context of a campaign by the United Hatters of North 
America, in an industry that was a typical case of regulatory unionism. The hat 
trade was dominated by small producers who collectively sought to contain the 
disruptive influence of low-quality, low-grade competitors.108 After a failed 
attempt to form a holding company, employers had turned to the United Hatters 
Union to help them bring order to the market.109 
The Danbury Hatters case challenged the efforts of the Hatters to enforce the 
employment of unionized workers in the industry. The case was brought by D. E. 
Loewe & Company, a low-wage, marginal producer of “soft” hats, seeking to 
avoid the strictures of the industry bargain and escape union influence. The 
AABA saw great promise in pursuing the case and, in the proceedings, made 
clear that this was not a struggle between “a man and the working people,” an 
unpopular position with many juries, but instead between one manufacturer and 
an unholy alliance between his competitors conspiring with a powerful national 
union.110 Although the decision fell short of the AABA’s initial goal of outlawing 
the closed shop, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “combinations which are 
composed of laborers acting in the interest of laborers” can be combinations in 
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.111 
The impact of the Danbury Hatters case resonated widely. Proprietary 
capitalists who before 1890 had not thought to turn to courts had come to realize 
how the judiciary could work for them.112 Promoting the courts as a key arena for 
doing battle with unions, the AABA (later rebranded The League for Industrial 
Rights) began publishing a journal called Law and Labor to educate and inform 
employers of the latest legal developments.113 The organization thus established 
itself as a “clearing house on all legal and constitutional phases of the labor 
problem.”114 It is no coincidence that sectoral employer and trade associations 
such as the National Metal Trades Association (NMTA), the National Founders 
Association (NFA), and the National Erectors Association (NEA), which had 
been organized to facilitate collective bargaining, turned belligerent towards 
unions between 1901 and 1906.115 
Shortly before Davenport’s appearance at the National Association of 
Manufacturers’ (NAM) national convention, NAM too had abandoned its 
earlier, more cooperative strategy in order to launch its famous “open shop” 
 
 107.  ERNST, supra note 34, at 13–19. 
 108.  See id. at 13 (describing the “unintelligent competition” of “lower, profitless grades” of hats). 
 109.  Id. at 13–14. 
 110.  Ernst, supra note 99, at 160. 
 111.  Loewe, 208 U.S. at 302. 
 112.  ERNST, supra note 34, at 55. 
 113.  WALTER GORDON MERRITT, HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS 96–99 
(1925). 
 114.  BONNETT, supra note 82, at 449. 
 115.  See id. at 63, 65, 69–71, 98, 101–05, 117–18, 131–33, 137–41 (describing the purpose and actions 
of each of these organizations during the early twentieth century). 
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campaign against labor.116 As NAM’s president David Parry put it in his 1903 
report to the membership: 
It is true that the fight against organized labor is, in a measure, a departure from our 
former conservative policy respecting labor, but it is an inevitable departure if the 
Association hopes to continue to fill the full measure of its possible usefulness to the 
manufacturers and people of the country.117 
In NAM’s Declaration of Principles, courts and the judiciary now figured 
prominently as an important forum for advancing its objectives. 
Throughout the open shop movement, NAM worked hand-in-glove with the 
AABA. The relationship between the two organizations was sealed in the context 
of another important court case, one that took direct aim at the cooperative 
arrangements between the SFNDA and the IMU in the stove industry discussed 
above. While “[m]ost of the leading stove manufacturers applauded [the 
cooperative agreements] for banishing ‘unfair’ competition,”118 one employer 
who chafed under the strictures of the deal was James van Cleave, President of 
Buck’s Stove and Range Company, who became president of NAM in 1906.119 
Spoiling for a fight to rally companies to the newly-embraced open shop cause, 
Van Cleave turned to the AABA to fight the case, which ultimately resulted in 
another major assault on unions in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. in 1911 
and solidified the partnership between NAM and the AABA.120 
This was not van Cleave’s first attack against unions: in 1907 van Cleave 
oversaw the establishment of a National Council for Industrial Defense whose 
purpose was “to focus all manufacturing power, local and national, on behalf of 
mutual interests in general, but particularly with respect to legislation bearing 
upon the labor question.”121 NAM also worked with local employers’ associations 
such as that in Detroit, which was an important center for the machine industry 
and which became an epicenter in conflicts over the open shop.122 Thus, the 
 
 116.  William Phillip Saunders, Jr., The Political Dimension of Labor-Management Relations: 
National Trends and State Level Developments in Massachusetts 138–39 (June 24, 1964) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author). 
 117.  Id. at 139. 
 118.  ERNST, supra note 34, at 126. 
 119.  Id. at 125–26; Ashley Williams, Who’s Who. . .NAM President James Van Cleave, HAGLEY (Nov. 
20, 2017), https://www.hagley.org/research/programs/nam-project-news/who’s-who. . .nam-president-
james-van-cleave%E2%80%8B [https://perma.cc/C3Y7-DHLJ]. 
 120.  See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 436, 449–52 (1911) (reviewing a lower 
court decision involving an injunction application against individuals boycotting Bucks’ products, who 
were then held in contempt of court; the case was dismissed on procedural grounds); BONNETT, supra 
note 82, at 459–60 (“While the union leaders thus escaped punishment under the laws relating to boycotts 
and violation of injunctions, the laws remained unchanged, in fact, were strongly asserted in decisions 
rendered in the course of the case through the courts.”); ERNST, supra note 34, at 124–46 (detailing the 
individuals and rationales behind the case and its effects). 
 121.  ROBERT A. BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER 201 (1943). 
 122.  See Klug, supra note 80, at 788–837. See STEPHEN MEYER III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY: LABOR 
MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 1908–1921, at 89 (1981) 
(“After 1902, Detroit was the ‘open shop’ city par excellence. At the time the Detroit Employers’ 
Association waged ‘a vigorous fight against the various unions in the metal industry’ and completely 
defeated the traditionally strong unions in the metal trades . . . . Until about 1912, the Employers’ 
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Employers’ Association of Detroit (EAD) worked with local firms to assist them 
in their battles with labor, and sometimes picked up the tab for their legal 
expenses.123 Among the services the EAD provided to its members was aiding 
them in securing labor injunctions, which had become “the most important legal 
weapon of employers” since the Pullman strike of 1894.124 Once an employer had 
secured an injunction, the EAD also helped them enforce it, rounding up 
affidavits from people who would testify to having witnessed threats and hiring 
undercover men with cameras to “amass evidence that could be used in court.”125 
As the EAD’s general counsel, George F. Monaghan, put it: “Your courts are 
your greatest protection.”126 The role of the injunction in defeating the efforts of 
early class-based unions is well-documented. 
In sum, the successes of these organizations, and the strategic use of the law 
by some firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, disrupted 
emerging strategies of collective self-help among firms and nascent multi-
employer bargaining arrangements with labor. From a comparative perspective, 
the important point is that the strategies that these organizations developed and 
perfected for waging legal battles further reduced incentives to develop the kind 
of coordinating capacities that were being developed in Europe. The prevailing 
U.S. antitrust regime put all forms of coordination among independent firms on 
tenuous legal ground, and unions that worked with employers to mitigate 
destructive competition through bargaining over wages and skills found 
themselves on the receiving—and losing—end of antitrust suits.127 In this period, 
budding forms of collective multi-firm coordination—both among employers and 
between labor and capital—withered as organizations such as the AABA 
encouraged them instead to mobilize the courts in battles that focused on the 
individual rights of firms and workers. Under these circumstances, there was little 
need or incentive for employers to construct strong associations, for, as one 
employer at the time remarked (with reference to the AABA), “we are getting 
more for our money out of this Association than any other.”128 
 
Association’s position towards organized labor prevailed, and Detroit had few successful strikes in its 
automobile shops and factories.”). 
 123.  Klug, supra note 80, at 727, 887. 
 124.  Id. at 821. In Michigan, the case that set the precedent for the use of the injunction was Beck v. 
Railway Teamsters Protective Union in 1898, which held that the union’s picketing amounted to unlawful 
intimidation. 118 Mich. 497, 529 (1898); Klug, supra note 80, at 821–23. 
 125.  Klug, supra note 80, at 827–28. 
 126.  Id. at 820–21. 
 127.  As Crane pointed out, only one of the first thirteen successful antitrust cases involved a 
combination of capitalists; in all other cases it was labor combinations that were found in violation of 
antitrust law. Daniel A. Crane, The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in the Progressive Era 
and the New Deal, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 109, 115 (Naomi Lamoreaux & 
William J. Novak eds., 2017). 
 128.  Ernst, supra note 99, at 83. 
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IV 
THE GERMAN CASE 
The legal status of cartels in Germany in the late nineteenth century was the 
mirror image of that in the United States. While the U.S. Supreme Court shaped 
competition policy through its interpretations of the Sherman Act, Germany’s 
supreme court, the Reichsgericht, exercised direct influence through rulings it was 
called upon to make in the absence of similar legislation.129 In the same year the 
Sherman Act was passed, the Reichsgericht ruled that businesses were allowed to 
regulate markets by engaging in “self-help on a cooperative basis” in order to 
prevent disruptive hyper-competition.130 
Eighty-seven wood pulp producers in Saxony acted in just such a manner 
when they organized themselves in 1893 as a price cartel to protect themselves 
against pernicious competition.131 The Saxony Wood Pulp Producers Association 
(Sächsische Holzstoff-Fabrikanten-Verband) established a common sales agency 
through which all members would sell at the same “reasonable” price.132 The 
courts were drawn in when a member went outside this arrangement in 1894 and 
1895 and sought relief from the penalties imposed by the cartel.133 The court 
found for the cartel, and indeed went further, by creating “a strong presumption” 
in favor of such arrangements as a justified measure in the interests of self-help.134 
Specifically, the court decision “assumed crisis protection to be the likely purpose 
of any cartel” and held that these agreements only stepped outside the bounds of 
the law when their purpose was either to create a monopoly or to exploit 
consumers, or where such monopoly or exploitation actually resulted from such 
cartels.135 With that, German courts signaled that they would be willing to 
intervene only in extreme cases, declaring cartels and syndicates to be “especially 
 
 129.  See RICHTER, supra note 54, at 60. 
 130.  Nörr, supra note 48, at 7. Germans followed developments in the United States closely. An 1894 
essay by Ernst Levy von Halle (presented at the 1895 convention of the Verein), entitled “Kartelle in 
Deutschland und im Auslande” described American antitrust law in detail and concluded that the 
American law was not effective in defeating the trusts and if anything had simply resulted in old trusts 
being converted to new forms (through merger and acquisition). According to Richter, the essay had a 
profound effect on the German discussion, promoting the idea that it would be more effective to allow—
but then regulate—cartels. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 181. 
 131.  Id. at 57. 
 132.  Id. at 72. 
 133.  The Wood Pulp association was formed as a syndicate, in which all members agreed to sell 
exclusively through a joint sales arrangement. The penalty for violations was thirty marks per dry ton of 
wood pulp. The case was brought by a pulp producer who sold outside the syndicate and refused to pay 
the fine, and argued that the cartel contract violated the principle of freedom of association 
(Gewerbefreiheit). Id. at 71–72. 
 134.  William R. Cornish, Legal Control over Cartels and Monopolization 1880–1914: A Comparison, 
in LAW AND THE FORMATION OF THE BIG ENTERPRISES IN THE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES 280, 
300 (Norbert Horn & Jürgen Kocka eds., 1979). 
 135.  Id. 
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suited” to serve the economy by protecting against inefficient loss-generating 
overproduction and the associated “catastrophes.”136 
As in the United States, the economic turbulence of the 1870s and 1880s had 
prompted the formation of various sorts of cooperative arrangements, and the 
1897 ruling by the German court in favor of cartels in the Wood Pulp Producers 
Association case was important for putting these arrangements on solid legal 
footing. Thus, cartels in Germany—already growing before the court’s decision—
expanded rapidly after their legal status was clarified. Although the exact number 
of cartels is uncertain, figures reported by the German Interior Ministry suggest 
that there were 385 by 1902 and over 500 by 1918.137 
Despite the consensus in academic and legal circles, the growing influence of 
massive concentrations of economic power in key infrastructural industries 
generated discontent among firms that relied on these inputs, as well as unease 
in the population at large, who saw in these cartels an effort to fleece consumers 
in the name of higher profits.138 When a sharp increase in coal prices in 1900 and 
1901 heightened such concerns, the state reluctantly yielded to this pressure and 
appointed a commission to investigate the price-raising behavior and effects of 
the cartels. The Verein debated the issue vigorously at its 1905 convention, but 
the prevailing view remained that cartels could serve as a bulwark both against 
the growth of large U.S.-style trusts, while also protecting against the “ravages of 
hyper-individualism.”139 Conference chair Karl Rathgen summarized the results 
of the Verein’s rather inconclusive twelve-hour debate by saying that though 
“cartels are a necessary part of economic development . . . in light of their 
proliferation . . . the state should do something. However, it is not possible to 
forge a unified position out of the diversity of proposals [that had emerged from 
the discussion].”140 
When the results of the government commission were finally revealed, the 
outcome was not the one anticipated by the critics.141 The commission’s report 
did not call for major changes, and instead reaffirmed that cartels served the 
collective interests of society.142 In the end, Germany did not pass a cartel law 
until much later, in 1923, and when it did, the “decree concerning abuses of 
economic power” did not prohibit cartels.143 It did establish new oversight 
 
 136.  JOCHEN MOHR, SICHERUNG DER VERTRAGSFREIHEIT DURCH WETTBEWERBS—UND 
REGULIERUNGSRECHT 151 (2015) (translating the original text). 
 137.  OTTO POLYSIUS, VERBANDSBESTREBUNGEN IM DEUTSCHEN MASCHINENBAU 20 (1921). 
 138.  Id. at 4. 
 139.  RICHTER, supra note 54, at 207–10; Nörr, supra note 48, at 7. 
 140.  RICHTER, supra note 54, at 209–10. 
 141.  POLYSIUS, supra note 137, at 4. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Gregory Jackson, The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan, in 
THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN COMPARISON 121, 135 
(Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001); see also Wilfried Feldenkirchen, Competition Policy 
in Germany, 21 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 257, 259 (1992). 
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mechanisms, notably through the creation of a cartel court.144 But the court’s 
purpose was not to suppress cartels, and its functions mostly revolved around 
adjudicating disputes that arose among cartel members, or between cartel 
members and outsiders.145 
Like their American counterparts, small, skill-dependent firms in Germany 
had also responded to market turbulence through cooperative arrangements to 
stabilize the market, but they did so in this radically different legal context. The 
solutions they devised drew on older traditions in which small, regionally-based 
producers solved their collective action problems through governance 
arrangements among firms; these arrangements were managed by trade 
associations and sometimes policed by unions.146 These firms and regions have 
received far less attention than the large autarkic firms and cartels of the late 
nineteenth century, but they were actually the early core of German 
industrialization and the site of a very different industrial order.147 
The hub of much of this activity was the decentralized industrial districts of 
the southwest in Württemberg, Saxony, and the Bergisches Land south of the 
Ruhr.148 Faced with intense market volatility, these firms banded together to 
socialize risks and reduce uncertainty by coordinating—on wages, on production 
strategies, on technology, on training—not to eliminate but to manage 
competition among themselves in the market.149 Their efforts at cooperative self-
help were smiled upon by the national government, and were often also actively 
facilitated by their own local and regional governments.150 
Depending on the character of the industry, these firms organized different 
types of cooperative arrangements to address the particular kinds of competitive 
challenges they faced, either on a formal or, very often, more informal basis.151 
Thus, for example, in industries like cotton textile finishing and cutlery in which 
the main production cost was labor, price cartels operated to dampen cutthroat 
competition in downturns.152 In other sectors, such as the textile trades, term-
fixing cartels established shared guidelines for payment and delivery schedules, 
thus preventing firms from “destroying one another by attempting to gain orders 
by offering to perform services on increasingly unreasonable terms.”153 In the 
machinery and other capital-goods producing industries, specialization cartels—
 
 144.  Jackson, supra note 143, at 135. 
 145.  William C. Kessler, German Cartel Regulation Under the Decree of 1923, 50 Q.J. ECON. 680, 
681–82 (1936). 
 146.  See HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 33–71. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 166. 
 149.  Id. at 59–65. 
 150.  See Hal Hansen, Caps and Gowns: Historical Reflections on the Institutions that Shaped 
Learning for and at Work in Germany and the United States, 1800–1945, at 194–95 (1997) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with author) (discussing state promotion 
of such arrangements in Germany’s southwestern states). 
 151.  HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 60–65. 
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also known as finishing associations—involved arrangements in which member 
firms “agreed to specialize in one or several lines of a product (for example, 
particular machine tool types, such as lathes) while ceding other lines to other 
members of the association.”154 
Through such arrangements, these producers sought to protect themselves 
against customers (including state contractors) who sought to engage them in 
destructive bidding wars.155 For example, potential buyers sometimes imposed 
harsh terms of delivery or payment, to which firms would have to agree in order 
to win the contract. In other cases, clients would award the contract to the lowest 
bidder but then ask the firm to perform the work according to the plan that had 
been put forth by some other firm for a higher bid. Furthermore, since company 
bids for contracts often included detailed production plans, firms were constantly 
exposed to the threat of intellectual property theft. Individual firms on their own 
were powerless to fight these practices. Such problems, as Otto Polysius 
emphasized, could only be overcome through collective organization.156 
Whatever their form, these arrangements—many of which would have been 
illegal under the prevailing legal regime in the United States—served to stabilize 
competition in the face of turbulence.157 More than this, these arrangements also 
provided a space within which it was safe for member firms to contribute to 
building and maintaining complementary institutions of collective self-help that 
would benefit all of them.158 Thus, these regions developed or preserved 
institutions designed to support cooperation in other areas as well. These 
included vocational schools to promote ongoing skill formation and to cultivate 
and expand the skill base of the local work force—the opposite of the deskilling 
strategies taking hold in the United States at this time.159 They also included 
technical institutes, often with support from the state government, to disseminate 
the latest know-how and to promote ongoing adaptation to the latest 
technological developments.160 Finally, they included cooperative financial 
arrangements to assist firms in securing investment capital for growth and 
innovation, as well as arrangements for shared standard-setting and help to firms 
in bringing their diverse products to broader (also world) markets.161 
The political-economic ecosystem in these regions allowed small firms to 
avoid destructive price wars and also encouraged them to collectively move up-
market into higher value-added market segments. The powerful German 
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Mechanical Engineering Association (VDMA) grew out of one such regional 
association that had originally been founded in 1890 to improve delivery and 
payment conditions, resist unreasonable demands of customers, and establish 
reasonable prices.162 The VDMA saw its main task as eliminating abuses that 
caused “unhealthy” competition.163 To that end, it sought to promote accurate 
cost-accounting among firms, establish unitary delivery and payment conditions, 
and develop collective strategies to protect proprietary drawings and ideas.164 
When Friedrich Fröhlich took over as managing director of VDMA in 1910, he 
continued the VDMA’s emphasis on quality over price; in his words, “[b]etter 
expensive and good than cheap and bad.”165 
As in the United States, large cartels in Germany fought against unions 
furiously and very successfully, but these smaller manufacturing firms that were 
engaged in skill-intensive specialized production found it necessary to maintain 
cordial relations with the skilled workers on whom they relied.166 Indeed, their 
dependence on skilled labor grew as competition came to center on product 
quality rather than price. Thus, the regions in which these cooperative 
arrangements among small independent proprietors flourished were more 
congenial to union organizing, and formed the heart of the German labor 
movement in the late nineteenth century. Unions in these areas organized and 
bargained for a far larger share of the workforce than in the centers of heavy 
industry in the Ruhr Valley. As Klaus Schönhoven noted, in 1913, fully three-
quarters of all German workers who were covered by collective agreements were 
employed in small and medium-sized firms with fifty or fewer employees.167 
Like their American counterparts, the unions in these areas were 
overwhelmingly organized along craft lines, and represented different ideological 
leanings (Catholic, Marxian social democratic, or Lassallean-socialist, depending 
in part on the region).168 However, while their counterparts in the United States 
would find themselves caught in the cross-fire between high- and low-end 
employers, skilled unions in Germany’s decentralized industrial districts shared 
with employers a strong interest in increasing and expanding the supply of skills 
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on which the regional economy depended.169 Regional training institutions 
actively supported the ongoing upgrading of worker skills and adaptation to the 
latest technical developments.170 Because these arrangements were organized 
collectively, they also promoted skill portability across the regional labor market, 
facilitating the movement of workers across firms and related industries.171 In this 
way, they supported multi-firm bargaining and encouraged the development of 
encompassing labor organizations.172 In this context, multi-employer collective 
bargaining served as a further framework for socializing risk across firms by 
standardizing wages, thus reducing costly competition among employers for 
skilled labor. Unions in Germany’s decentralized industrial order were thus part 
of a broader ecosystem of coordination and one that was not experienced by 
member firms as constraining, but instead as deeply enabling. 
The arrangements for cooperative self-help forged in this period survived the 
First World War, as well as the transition to democracy and the incorporation of 
labor under the first social democratic government of the Weimar Republic.173 
Indeed, as Nörr pointed out, the cartel idea if anything “received a boost” with 
the constitutional charter of 1919, which embraced the idea of a collectively 
governed economy as an alternative to both laissez-faire and direct state 
control.174 With the transition to democracy, the views of influential social 
democrats, including the great Marxist theorist and Minister of Finance Rudolf 
Hilferding, shifted considerably.175 Hilferding, who before the war had authored 
a scathing critique of economic concentration,176 came to view a high level of 
employer organization as an important tool for the political management of 
capitalism.177 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
The developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
emphasized in this Article did not, of course, mark the end of the story. But they 
did leave an enduring imprint on the subsequent evolution of these two political 
economies. The U.S. antitrust regime of the late nineteenth century not only 
hastened the growth of large autarkic and mostly anti-labor firms in the great 
merger movement. It also played a significant role in disrupting alternative 
emerging forms of inter-firm cooperation among smaller, skill-dependent 
producers who attempted to defend themselves against the ravages of the market 
through collective self-help. The prevailing legal regime in the United States not 
only undermined such efforts, it provided a way for low-road producers to use 
the courts to disrupt efforts to enlist unions to police and enforce shared rules. In 
short, in the United States, what was weeded out—not by the market but by the 
courts—were the kinds of strong sectoral organizations and nascent multi-
employer bargaining with unions that were taking hold elsewhere, including in 
Germany. It is an irony of history that one of the most lasting legacies of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act was to clear the way for large dominant producers even 
as it wiped out the seeds of these countervailing organizational forces that 
elsewhere now serve as a check on the behavior of disruptive new firms with 
monopolistic ambitions, an increasingly prevalent part of the American political 
economic landscape.178 
By contrast, Germany’s very different legal framework facilitated and 
supported precisely those forms of coordination that were being dismantled in 
the United States. There, the period from the 1870s through the 1890s spawned 
a number of new types of economic organization. Beyond the well-known—and 
later notorious—large cartels, these also included increasingly vibrant trade 
associations. These trade associations were actively involved in managing skill 
formation and competition among smaller producers, often in cooperation with 
skilled unions organized on an industrial basis. The overall effect was to 
encourage the development of a much more elaborate system of mutual support 
that stabilized competition in the face of turbulence and preserved a place for the 
kind of high quality, high skill, high value-added production for which German 
industry came to be known. 
The legacy of the late nineteenth century also weighs heavily on the labor 
regimes that emerged in the two countries. As we have seen, German 
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competition policy actively supported collective organization and often 
prioritized the interests of the collective over that of the individual firm.179 The 
same principle applied on the labor side as well.180 Thus, the German labor regime 
came to rest on a separate body of law that is expressly organized around 
adjudicating class-based claims. While acknowledging the employer’s right to 
manage and a worker’s freedom to join unions, German labor law emphasizes 
the primacy of organized labor’s collective rights.181 The basic premise is that 
because of the asymmetry in power between the individual worker and his 
employer, freedom of contract in the context of the employment relationship 
requires the protection of collective rights.182 This core principle has been 
enormously important in protecting the status and position of unions in Europe’s 
coordinated market economies precisely because it sets limits on what in the 
United States would be considered an individual’s contractual freedoms.183 
Collective labor law, as Däubler pointed out, is strengthened to the extent that 
individual rights can be limited in the interest of the collective.184 
Turning to the American case, it is also clear that the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act185 did not mark a great reversal in the evolution of labor relations 
in the United States, but if anything represents the culmination of the dynamics 
described above. As Forbath has emphasized, the battles over labor’s rights in 
the United States were fought in the courts on the (for employers, more 
congenial) terrain and in the language of individual rights.186 However, as 
Andrias noted, the resulting labor law “settlement” proved to be a very flimsy 
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foundation for guaranteeing labor’s collective rights.187After the defeat through 
disarticulation of the efforts described above to establish industry-wide 
bargaining, American employers unified around the pursuit of a deregulatory 
agenda that continues to discourage coordination on both sides of the class divide 
by centering instead on individual freedom and choice. AABA founder and its 
counsel Daniel Davenport summarized the fruits of the AABA’s legal strategies 
in the first decade of the twentieth century thus: “The great effort of the Society 
has been with the help of the Judiciary, to write into the fabric of American 
jurisprudence [the principle of individual liberty].”188 This principle forms the 
central theme around which American employers continue to organize—and it 
runs like a red thread through the history of American labor relations, from the 
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